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RETHINKING ROADBLOCKS TO MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY
ABSTRACT
This Comment argues that Congress should remove roadblocks that prevent
municipalities from easily filing for bankruptcy. It shows that statutory and ad
hoc roadblocks allow states and the federal government to exert excessive
pressure on fiscally distressed municipalities. Further, while scholars claim that
the Bankruptcy Code provides bankruptcy courts with too little power to
adjudicate municipal bankruptcies and that municipal fiscal distress should be
resolved by states, this Comment argues that federal bankruptcy courts are the
proper venue to resolve municipal distress and that these courts have sufficient
power. This power could be used more effectively by removing chapter 9’s
insolvency requirement and inducing states to allow quicker access to
bankruptcy courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Municipal bankruptcies necessarily involve every level of government.
Municipalities are only allowed to file for bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), and chapter 9 applies only to municipalities.1
Municipalities must be “specifically authorized” by their states to file for
bankruptcy.2 The federal government provides the forum and statutory
framework under which municipal bankruptcies are litigated, and the
Constitution gives Congress the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”3 Constitutional concerns and
principles of federalism have shaped the history of municipal bankruptcies4 and
continue to shape how bankruptcy courts adjudicate municipal bankruptcies.5
All non-bankruptcy resolutions of municipal debt must involve municipalities
and state governments, and some cases may also include the federal
government.6 For example, some states have financial control boards that take
over distressed municipalities while trying to resolve debt issues.7 Finally, the
federal government has long been involved in municipal debt markets8 and has
intervened directly to address financial distress in Puerto Rico, Washington,
D.C., and New York City.9
1
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2018) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 . . . if and only if such entity
is a municipality.”). Chapter 7 is restricted to certain “person[s].” Id. § 109(b). A municipality is not a person
under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 101(41). Chapter 11 is restricted to those eligible for Chapter 7, railroads, and
certain banks and clearinghouses. Id. § 109(d). Chapter 13 is restricted to “an individual with regular income.”
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2018). Chapter 12 is restricted to family farmers and fishermen. Id. § 109(f).
2
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4
See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (holding initial
municipal bankruptcy legislation unconstitutional because states would “no longer [be] free to manage their own
affairs”); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 457 (1993) (explaining state authorization requirement “has roots
in the constitutional principle that the federal government may not interfere with the internal governance of a
state or its political subdivisions”).
5
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018) (limiting the power of bankruptcy courts in municipal bankruptcies).
6
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285 (2012) (explaining that municipal distress necessarily impacts state and
federal governments).
7
See Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L. REV.
733, 734 (1997) (“The term ‘financial control board’ (FCB) refers to any state-created agency established by
statute to oversee the financial affairs of a city during a fiscal crisis.”) (internal citation omitted).
8
See David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State
and Local Budget Crises 4, 15–53 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278 (describing the federal government’s history of involvement with state
and local finances).
9
See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 101, 130
Stat. 549, 553 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2121 (2018)); District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and
Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, § 101, 109 Stat. 97, 100; New York City Seasonal
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To file for bankruptcy, municipalities must satisfy stricter filing
requirements than other debtors.10 The strict filing requirements are coupled
with specific statutory limitations on state and federal government activities as
they relate to the debtor municipality.11 The stricter requirements, and
particularly the requirement that a debtor municipality be insolvent before filing,
along with post-filing limitations, create a window and motive for state and
federal governments to strong-arm municipalities into adopting their preferred
debt resolution strategies. The restrictions also exacerbate the municipality’s
debt problems as they extend the time required to resolve debt issues and may
force the municipality to continue adding to its pile of debt.12
The literature around municipal bankruptcy tends to portray distressed
municipalities as having incurred too much debt and then refusing to make
difficult decisions, such as tax increases and service cuts, to pay back the debt.13
Under this view, municipalities threaten to file for bankruptcy to force state and
federal governments into bailing them out.14 State and federal governments
acquiesce to these threats because failing to do so would lead to contagion in
municipal bond markets or would violate implicit guarantees potentially priced
into the cost for municipal credit.15 Starting from this diagnosis, this view
suggests either dramatically increasing the power of the bankruptcy court by
allowing it to raise taxes, cut spending, and sell municipal property,16 or
Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, § 4(a), 89 Stat 797, 797.
10
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 461 (1993). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018) (describing
when an entity may be a debtor in a chapter 9 bankruptcy), with 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2018) (describing when an
individual may be a debtor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy).
11
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018) (providing the protections afforded by the automatic stay); id. § 903
(generally reserving state power but preventing states from changing composition of debt); id. § 904 (limiting
bankruptcy court’s power); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 462–63 (1993); see also Dorothy A. Brown,
Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local
Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 626 (1995) (explaining how Bridgeport filing for bankruptcy prevented
Connecticut from seeking a writ of mandamus to increase property taxes).
12
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 462–63 (1993); see Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and
Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR.
DEVS. J. 625, 629, 639–40 (1995) (describing Bridgeport’s increased borrowing costs and the dismissal of its
bankruptcy petition).
13
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 282 (2012) (listing examples of municipalities rejecting tax increases or
service cuts during episodes of fiscal distress).
14
See id. at 283–84.
15
See id. at 286–87; Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 460 (1993).
16
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
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dramatically scaling back the bankruptcy court’s power by allowing it only to
bind creditors who holdout from resolution plans.17
This Comment rebuts the argument that municipalities threaten to file for
bankruptcy to force federal and state governments to bail them out. Instead,
federal and state governments use bailouts along with longstanding and ad hoc
roadblocks to prevent municipalities from accessing bankruptcy courts. These
access restrictions allow states and the federal government to exert greater
control over distressed municipalities than they would have in a bankruptcy
proceeding.18 Further, these roadblocks increase the time and cost required to
resolve a municipality’s debt situation.19
This Comment further argues that bankruptcy courts have sufficient power
to resolve municipal bankruptcies, and that if the federal government wants
chapter 9 to be a useful tool, it should relax the statutory filing requirements and
provide states with incentives to allow their municipalities easier access to
bankruptcy courts. Doing so would allow municipalities timely access to
bankruptcy protection and allow the municipalities to retain autonomy in the
process. Those outcomes would be consistent with the goals of bankruptcy
generally and with principles of federalism.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part II provides some background on
municipal bankruptcy, illustrates the roadblocks faced by municipalities trying
to file for bankruptcy, discusses the policy underlying bankruptcy, and explains
the literature’s criticisms of municipal bankruptcy. Part III argues that federal
bankruptcy courts are the proper venue for municipal debt resolution and that
chapter 9’s filing requirements should be relaxed. Part IV concludes.

Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 475–76 (1993); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 295–96 (2012).
17
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 395 (2010).
18
Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study
in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 626 (1995); Tami Luhby, Troubled Harrisburg Now
State’s Problem, CNN: MONEY (Nov. 23, 2011, 5:30 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/23/news/economy/
harrisburg_bankruptcy/index.htm.
19
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
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BACKGROUND

A. A Brief Overview of Municipal Bankruptcy
Chapter 9 is used infrequently. Only 29 municipalities filed for bankruptcy
between 2001 and 2017.20 Detroit, with more than $18 billion in debt, filed for
bankruptcy in 2013, making it the largest municipal bankruptcy case to date.21
Municipalities can only file for bankruptcy through chapter 9 of the Code,
and chapter 9 applies only to municipalities.22 Congress first provided for
municipal bankruptcies in 1934, with a predecessor to chapter 9, in response to
the Great Depression, primarily to overcome issues posed by holdout debtors.23
During the Great Depression, many fiscally distressed municipalities negotiated
debt adjustment plans with their creditors but could not carry out those plans
because of the “strategic resistance of a small minority” of creditors, or
holdouts.24 Federal municipal bankruptcy legislation allowed a court to make
debt adjustment plans binding on holdout creditors.25
The Supreme Court held this legislation to be unconstitutional in 1936.26
Congress enacted some minor, potentially irrelevant, revisions to the statute,
which the Supreme Court upheld in 1938.27 In 1976, responding to New York
City’s fiscal crisis, Congress substantially updated Chapter 9 to what we see
now.28

20
Mary Murphy, Local Governments Rarely File for Bankruptcy, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 6,
2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2018/02/local-governments-rarely-filefor-bankruptcy.
21
Danielle Kurtzleben, Everything You Need to Know About the Detroit Bankruptcy, VOX (Dec. 15, 2014,
12:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/18073574/detroit-bankruptcy-pensions-municipal.
22
11 U.S.C. § 109 (2018); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(40), (41) (2018).
23
Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 450–51 (1993); Omer
Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 364–65
(2010).
24
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 363 (2010).
25
See id. at 364–65.
26
Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936).
27
Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); Michael W.
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 452–53 (1993).
28
See Pub L. No. 94–260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A
Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 366–69 (2010).
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An entity can file for bankruptcy under chapter 9 “if and only if such
entity”:29
(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized . . . by State law. . .;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5)
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a
majority in amount of the claims of each class . . .;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to
obtain the agreement of creditors . . .;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiation is impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a
transfer that is avoidable . . ..30

Relative to other debtors, municipalities must satisfy more requirements before
filing for bankruptcy. As Professor Melissa Jacoby notes, “[i]t is very, very
difficult for a municipality to be eligible for bankruptcy.”31 Non-municipal
debtors do not have be authorized by state law or be insolvent, nor are they
required to negotiate with creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy.32 However,
also unlike other chapters, chapter 9 only allows a municipality, and not its
creditors, to file a plan to adjust its debts.33
The Code places significant limits on what a bankruptcy court can do when
adjudicating a municipal bankruptcy relative to what it can do in other
bankruptcies.34 A bankruptcy court cannot, without the municipal debtor’s
consent, interfere with the debtor’s political or governmental powers, property

29

11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018).
Id.
31
Danielle Kurtzleben, Everything You Need to Know About the Detroit Bankruptcy, VOX (Dec. 15, 2014,
12:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/18073574/detroit-bankruptcy-pensions-municipal.
32
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 455–57 (1993). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018) (listing
requirements to file for municipal bankruptcy), with 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2018) (broadly allowing most entities
to file for chapter 7 bankruptcy).
33
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 463 (1993). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2018) (stating that the
debtor shall file a plan), with 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2018) (stating that any party in interest may file a plan).
34
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 462 (1993) (noting that “a major difference between municipal
and private bankruptcy is the degree of control exercised by the court over the debtor” and illustrating this
difference with specific examples of what courts can – or cannot – do in both contexts).
30
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or revenues, or use or enjoyment of income-producing property.35 This means
that a bankruptcy court cannot unilaterally order a municipal debtor to raise
taxes, cut public services, or sell municipal property.36 The Code also recognizes
and specifically preserves a state’s power to control a municipality.37 However,
it restricts the state from modifying the composition of the municipality’s debt
without the consent of the municipality’s creditors.38 Further, like non-municipal
debtors, once a municipality files for bankruptcy, it is protected from external
actions by the Code’s automatic stay provisions.39 Among other restrictions, the
automatic stay prevents creditors from collecting on their debts and executing
liens and prevents the state from raising taxes on the municipality’s residents.40
The structure of the Code, therefore, makes it difficult for a municipality to file
in the first instance, but once it clears those hurdles, the municipality has
significant control over the proceeding.41
1. The Specific Authorization Requirement Makes States Into Gatekeepers
To Municipal Bankruptcy
Chapter 9 requires that a municipality filing for bankruptcy be “specifically
authorized . . . to be a debtor under [chapter 9] by State law.”42 The specific
authorization provision of the Code makes states explicit gatekeepers for
municipalities attempting to access the bankruptcy court.43 The state
authorization provision might be required to preserve a state’s power over its
municipalities, and it may be unconstitutional to prevent states from deciding
how or if their municipalities can file for bankruptcy.44
States have adopted various approaches in deciding if or how their
municipalities can file for bankruptcy.45 Some states, like Texas, provide a
35

11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018).
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 474 (1993).
37
11 U.S.C. § 903 (2018).
38
Id. § 903(1).
39
Id. § 362; see also id. § 901 (making the automatic stay applicable to chapter 9).
40
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(2), (4), (7) (2018); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The
Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 626
(1995).
41
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 356–57 (2010); see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 463 (1993).
42
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
43
Id.
44
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 457 (1993).
45
M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
36
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blanket authorization for municipalities to file for bankruptcy, while others, such
as Georgia, explicitly prohibit their municipalities from filing.46
Other states use complex, multi-step processes which must be exhausted
before turning to chapter 9.47 Michigan’s process is a common example of the
complex process a municipality must navigate before filing for bankruptcy.48
Upon the occurrence of one or more of nineteen events, including a request from
local government officials, a low enough credit rating, and “the state treasurer’s
sole discretion,” “the state financial authority may conduct a preliminary review
to determine the existence of probable financial stress within a local
government.”49 The state financial authority prepares a report for “the local
emergency financial assistance loan board,” which determines if there is
“probable financial stress.”50 Then the governor appoints a team made up of
representatives of state executive and legislative leadership to review the
municipality’s finances again and prepare another report.51 After receiving that
report, the governor finally determines whether the municipality is facing a
financial emergency, a decision which the municipality can appeal.52 If the
determination stands, the municipality can choose from a menu of four options,
which include entering into a consent agreement, having an emergency manager
appointed, entering into a “neutral evaluation process,” or filing for chapter 9.53
But the municipality can only choose chapter 9 if the governor specifically
approves the filing.54 Approval can come with conditions, such as appointing
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 834 (2015).
46
See id. at 835–38. Compare TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 140.001 (West 2021) (providing blanket
authorization for municipalities to file for bankruptcy), with GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (West 2021) (disallowing
municipalities from filing for bankruptcy).
47
See M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 838–48 (2015).
48
See id. at 844–48.
49
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1544(1) (West 2020); see M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter
9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health,
84 MISS. L.J. 817, 844, n.130 (2015).
50
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1544(3) (West 2020); see M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter
9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health,
84 MISS. L.J. 817, 845 (2015).
51
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1544(4) (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1545(3) (West
2020); see M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 845 (2015).
52
M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 845 (2015); see MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 141.1545 (West 2020).
53
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1547(1) (West 2020); see M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter
9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health,
84 MISS. L.J. 817, 845–48 (2015).
54
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1547(1)(d) (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1566 (West
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someone to act on behalf of the municipality in chapter 9.55 Denial requires the
municipality to choose from the remaining three options.56 If the city chooses to
have an emergency manager appointed, the emergency manager can recommend
and request approval from the governor to file for chapter 9, if “no reasonable
alternative” exists.”57 Similarly, if the neutral evaluation process does not
resolve disputes between the municipality and creditors, the municipality can
request the governor’s approval to file for chapter 9.58
In Detroit’s bankruptcy case, the city had an emergency manager who
requested the governor’s approval for chapter 9.59 The governor approved this
request.60 Objectors argued that this authorization was deficient since the act
establishing the process for a Michigan municipality to file for bankruptcy
violated the state’s constitution.61 The court dismissed the objections, upheld the
constitutionality of the underlying act, and found that Detroit was specifically
authorized to file for bankruptcy, as required by chapter 9.62
At other times, states alter authorization statutes to prevent a specific
bankruptcy filing. In December 2010, Pennsylvania found, after a request from
Harrisburg, that Harrisburg was in “‘municipal financial distress.’”63 Then,
while Harrisburg and Pennsylvania were negotiating resolution plans,
Pennsylvania enacted a one-year ban on certain municipalities filing for
bankruptcy, just a few months before Harrisburg’s city council ultimately
filed.64 Thus a filing that may well have been permitted in June 2011 was clearly
prohibited in July.65 Pennsylvania later amended its code so that municipalities
could no longer directly file for bankruptcy.66 Instead, they now have to apply

2020); see M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 848 (2015).
55
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1566(2) (West 2020); see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1547(1)
(West 2020); M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 848 (2015).
56
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1566(3) (West 2020).
57
Id. § 141.1558(1).
58
Id. § 141.1565(23).
59
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
60
Id. at 248.
61
Id. at 248–49.
62
Id. at 261.
63
In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 750 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).
64
Id. at 750–52.
65
Id. at 754–55.
66
Compare 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.261 (West 2020), with 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 11701.261 (West 2012).
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to and receive permission from Pennsylvania’s Department of Community and
Economic Development before filing for bankruptcy.67
2. The Insolvency Requirement Prevents Distressed Municipalities From
Receiving Bankruptcy Protection
The insolvency requirement functions as a significant roadblock between
municipalities and the bankruptcy court.68 The Code provides two tests for
insolvency, and a municipality must satisfy one of these two tests: the
municipality must show that it either is “generally not paying its debts as they
become due,” or “unable to pay its debts as they become due.” 69 The former test
asks whether the municipality is currently insolvent and “requires general
nonpayment of debts as they become due.”70 A municipality that is not paying a
single claim, or a “single category of claims” would not qualify as insolvent
under this test.71
The latter insolvency test is based on cash flow.72 The municipality would
have to show that it will not be able to pay debts maturing in the future.73 In
Bridgeport, the court restricted the time horizon for future insolvency to the
current or next fiscal year, a decision that has been followed in subsequent
municipal bankruptcies.74 Ascertaining whether a municipality will become
insolvent is an exercise in weighing various financial projections. The ambiguity
in administering the test, cloaked as “mathematical precision,” has led to the
development of the “‘service delivery insolvency’ test.”75 This test is “typically
defined in terms of a significant reduction in the availability of city services.”76
By contrast, non-municipal entities, which are not required to be insolvent
to file for bankruptcy, are defined as insolvent if their debt is greater than the
67

53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.261 (West 2020); id. § 11701.103.
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993) (“The insolvency standard delays and discourages
municipal bankruptcy filings and thus serves as an effective gatekeeper.”).
69
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2018) (listing two tests); see also In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1991) (noting “[t]he two parts of § 101(32)(C) are joined by the disjunctive ‘or’.”).
70
In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 171 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (emphasis in original).
71
Id. at 171.
72
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
73
See id. at 456 (“[B]ills will arrive in six months and cannot be paid then.”).
74
In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); see, e.g., In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156,
172 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011).
75
Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy, 2019
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1214, 1218 (2019).
76
Id. at 1218.
68
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value of their assets.77 The definition of insolvency is different for municipal and
non-municipal debtors because the municipality’s physical assets are not
considered available to creditors.78 The insolvency requirement often prevents
municipalities from receiving bankruptcy protection.79
In Bridgeport, the decision on insolvency rested on whether the court
believed the state’s description of the situation or the city’s.80 To make the
finding that Bridgeport would be able to pay its bills as they came due in the
current fiscal year, the court reasoned Bridgeport could use funds available to
plug a $16,000,000 deficit which would have to be paid back in the next two
fiscal years.81 The later of the next two fiscal years was outside the court’s time
horizon, while Bridgeport did not have a budget for the next fiscal year which
could be used for a cash flow analysis.82 Thus, while it was clear that “Bridgeport
was undoubtedly in deep financial trouble,” it would have to take on more debt
since its financial troubles did not rise to the level of insolvency. 83 Similarly,
the court in Boise County found the county not to be insolvent since it could
cobble together funds from various potentially restricted funds to pay a judgment
against it.84 However, it is likely that if the service delivery insolvency test were
applied to Bridgeport, which the court noted could not adequately collect
garbage, plow snow, sweep streets, clean public buildings, or keep branch
libraries open more than one day a week, it too would have been found to be
insolvent.85

77

11 U.S.C. §§ 101(32)(A), (B) (2018).
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
79
See, e.g., In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (dismissing Bridgeport’s
bankruptcy petition because “financial difficulties short of insolvency are not a basis for chapter 9 relief.”); In
re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 180 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (dismissing Boise County’s bankruptcy petition
because “the County has not established it was insolvent”).
80
See In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal
Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty,
11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 638–39 (1995).
81
In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (“If in fact there is a budget gap, Bridgeport
will be
obligated to reimburse the contingency funds used to balance the budget, but it may do so in fiscal year 19921993
or fiscal year 1993-1994.”); see Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 293 (2012).
82
See In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (noting “there is not even a proposed
budget” for the 1992–1993 fiscal year).
83
Id. at 339.
84
In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 180 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011).
85
See In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail:
Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2019).
78
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In Detroit, the court found Detroit was insolvent under both tests. First, it
found that Detroit was not paying its debts as they became due as it deferred or
otherwise failed to make payments on pension obligations that were due.86 In
rejecting the argument that failure to make pension payments indicated a
“‘purposeful refusal to make a few payments comprising a relatively small part
of the City’s budget,’” the court reasoned the default was “particularly serious”
since “it put in jeopardy the City’s access to . . . one of the City’s few reliable
sources of income.”87
The court further held Detroit was insolvent on a cash-flow basis.88 But,
instead of relying on budget projections as the Bridgeport court did, the Detroit
court noted that “many services in the City . . . do not function properly as a
result of the City’s financial state.”89 This “firmly support[ed]” the holding that
Detroit was “unable to pay its debts as they became due.”90
Only after the court found Detroit to be eligible did the work of restructuring
its debts begin. In the end, the court confirmed a plan which discharged $7
billion in debt.91 The “centerpiece” of the plan was a Grand Bargain which
prevented creditors from selling off art held by the Detroit Institute of Arts
(“DIA”) by gathering the state and private donors to make contributions to
Detroit’s pension system.92
B. States and the Federal Government Often Set Up Ad Hoc Roadblocks
Preventing Municipalities From Filing for Bankruptcy
States and the federal government also set up ad hoc diversions from
bankruptcy, or otherwise influence the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings.
Sometimes these diversions come at the behest of municipalities, lending some
credence to the argument that municipalities may be using the threat of
bankruptcy to extract bailouts from states and the federal government.93 One
86

In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 262–63 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
Id. at 263.
88
Id. at 263.
89
Compare In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (quote source), with In re
Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
90
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
91
Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Plan to Exit Bankruptcy Is Approved for Detroit, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/detroit-bankruptcy-plan-ruling.html.
92
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55,
106; see Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit-institute-of-arts.html.
93
See Jeff Nussbaum, The Night New York Saved Itself from Bankruptcy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-night-new-york-saved-itself-from-bankruptcy (“New York’s
87

DAVE_PROOF_5.18.22

290

5/18/2022 1:49 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

such example is that of New York City in the 1970s. After initially refusing to
bailout New York, President Ford signed a bill providing New York with $2.3
billion in loans, allowing it to avoid filing for bankruptcy.94 New York City’s
experience led to changes in the Code which formed substantially the chapter 9
we have now.95
Sometimes states create policies to essentially control the outcome of a
future municipal bankruptcy proceeding. For example, after Central Falls,
Rhode Island went into receivership, but shortly before it filed for bankruptcy,
the Rhode Island legislature gave general obligation bondholders a statutory lien
on tax revenues.96 The effect was that throughout and after its bankruptcy,
Central Falls’ bondholders continued to be paid in full, while some retirees saw
their pensions cut up to 55%.97
C. The Policy Behind Bankruptcy Requires Keeping in Mind the Interests of
Residents of Distressed Municipalities and Allowing Quicker Access to the
Bankruptcy Court
The Code exists to provide debtors a fresh start.98 Chapter 9 may specifically
be “based on the idea of the fresh start rather than the efficient reconfiguration
of assets.”99 Giving a debtor a fresh start means reducing the debtor’s debt
burden so that it can “rehabilitate.”100 A fresh start would allow a municipality
leaders continued to petition for federal help.”).
94
David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 728–29 (2012); New York City
Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (1975); Martin Tolchin, 8% Interest Rate,
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 27, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/27/archives/8-interest-rate.html.
95
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 366–69 (2010).
96
David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675,
687–88 (2015); Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486610528775994; see Jess Bidgood, Plan to
End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html.
97
Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html. Professor Skeel asserts
that a bankruptcy court could possibly have ignored the statute by “conclude[ing] that the ‘lien’ created by the
Rhode Island lien statute [was] not a genuine lien.” David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal
Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 692.
98
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
99
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993).
100
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 372 (2010) (relating the “fresh start” to municipal bankruptcy filings by noting that, “[t]hrough
bankruptcy, the municipality is able to decrease its debt burden, which helps it to recover and resume financial
stability”).
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to potentially reduce taxes and increase services, making it a more attractive
place to live.101
Then-Professor Elizabeth Warren, while writing in the context of business
bankruptcies, takes a broad view of the policies underlying bankruptcy.102 In
effect, bankruptcy serves as a sort of “escape valve” to avoid debts under
“sufficiently compelling circumstances.”103 She contrasts bankruptcy to state
collection laws, explaining that state collection law works well in dealing with
a single debt.104 However, in a case where the debtor is collapsing, state
collection laws may not work well because faster creditors may collect a debtor’s
assets before slower creditors can get to the courthouse.105 In contrast,
bankruptcy is designed to deal with situations where the debtor may default on
not one, but all of their debts.106 Bankruptcy then distributes shares of a toosmall pie to multiple creditors by treating creditors equally and considering
creditors’ capacity to bear such costs.107 Critically, Warren points out that the
Code “serves the distributional interests of many who are not technically
‘creditors’ but who have an interest in a business’s continued existence.”108
Judge Steven Rhodes, the judge presiding over Detroit’s bankruptcy, echoed
these views by noting that “[t]he residents of the city had a great stake in [the]
outcome of the case,” and that he “‘recognize[d] and appreciate[d] the enormous
public interest in this case.’”109
Warren’s discussion is in conversation with views described by Professors
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson. In the latter’s view, the policy underlying
bankruptcy is much narrower and serves to promote the interests of creditors as
a group.110 Baird and Jackson agree that state collection laws are “grab” laws
which promote the interest of an individual creditor over the interest of all
creditors.111 Bankruptcy then serves the narrow purpose of preventing individual
101
Id. at 373; see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993).
102
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777–78 (1987).
103
Id. at 779.
104
Id. at 782.
105
See id. at 782.
106
Id. at 785.
107
See id. at 790–91.
108
Id. at 787.
109
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55,
95.
110
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 103 (1984).
111
Id. at 100.
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creditors from taking actions that benefit an individual creditor over all creditors
as a group.112 In arguing that bankruptcy law should focus only on “the interests
of those . . . who, outside of bankruptcy, have property rights in the assets of the
firm,”113 the Baird-Jackson view explicitly rejects the Warren view that a
bankruptcy court should consider the interests of non-creditors.114 For Baird and
Jackson, other concerns, such as negative impacts on employees and localities,
should be dealt with “through broad changes in the substantive law.”115
This Comment now turns to exploring the policy goals behind municipal
bankruptcies specifically. Like other entities, municipalities sometimes find
themselves in situations where they cannot pay their debts. Congress enacted the
first municipal bankruptcy legislation in response to widespread municipal
distress during the Great Depression and revised it in response to New York
City’s fiscal crisis.116 The setup of municipal bankruptcy, specifically the roles
played by state and federal governments, is the result of competing constitutional
principles.117 Congress has the power to enact bankruptcy legislation.118 But
when it comes to states and municipalities, the bankruptcy court is limited by
the Tenth Amendment.119 At the same time, states cannot impair contracts, and
so would not be able to discharge a municipality’s debt.120
There is some argument over the states’ power to impair contracts as it
relates to municipal bankruptcies. In 1942, the Supreme Court, in Faitoute,
upheld a New Jersey statute which bound unwilling creditors to a municipal debt
adjustment plan.121 The Court held that the debt adjustment, which consisted of
replacing old bonds with new ones, was not a violation of the Contracts
Clause.122 However, the Code explicitly disallows states from binding nonconsenting creditors.123 While acknowledging the Code overturns Faitoute’s
112

See id. at 106.
Id. at 103.
114
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (1987).
115
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 103 (1984).
116
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG 351, 362 (2010).
117
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 986–87 (1997).
118
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
119
See NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 986–87 (1997) (“Tenth
amendment concerns in legislating municipal bankruptcy provisions remain as vital today as in 1937.”); see U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
120
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
121
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508–09 (1942).
122
Id. at 514–16.
123
11 U.S.C. § 903 (2018).
113
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“specific holding,” McConnell and Picker argue that Faitoute may still be good
law.124 Yet, solutions related to municipal fiscal distress should not rely on
Faitoute for several reasons. First, without being able to bind dissenting
creditors, states and municipalities would find themselves struggling to address
the holdout problem which first gave rise to municipal bankruptcy legislation.125
Second, state-level municipal bankruptcy legislation would necessarily not be
“uniform” as the Constitution contemplates bankruptcy legislation to be.126
Third, the statute in Faitoute simply replaced old bonds with new bonds; it did
not, as a bankruptcy court could, discharge a municipality’s debt.127 Without
discharging debt, it is difficult for a municipality to truly have a fresh start.128
Finally, solutions to municipal debt problems should start from first principles
of policy instead of trying to find constitutional and statutory loopholes. That is
to say, it is possible to address chapter 9’s flaws in a manner that is uniform
across municipalities, that does not ask a bankruptcy court to violate the Tenth
Amendment and does not require states to find creative ways to impair contracts.
Warren’s insight about considering the distributional interests of noncreditors129 is particularly useful in the case of municipal bankruptcies. Among
examples of non-creditors with an interest in the debtor’s outcome, Warren
mentions the debtor’s employees, “nearby property owners who would have
suffered declining property values, and states or municipalities that would have
faced shrinking tax bases.”130 The observation that bankruptcy can and should
consider non-creditors’ interests is particularly relevant to municipal
bankruptcies because of the unique position of municipal residents. Residents
are neither creditors nor owners of the municipality, but surely have a stake in
how the municipality deals with its debt.131 While residents do not have a legal
right to a city’s revenues, “everyone (liberal, conservative, and libertarian alike)
assumes that residents have some claim to share in a city’s present and future
revenues.”132 This does not mean payouts from the municipality, but that

124
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 454 n. 127, 479–80.
125
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG 351, 363–65 (2010).
126
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
127
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 507 (1942).
128
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND BUSINESSES 37 (4th ed. 2015).
129
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (1987).
130
Id.
131
See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 358 (2010).
132
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1123 (2014).
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consistent with municipal insolvency laws, residents expect continued access to
the police, firefighters, water, and trash pickup.133 Ignoring residents’ interests
in municipal distress could, rather than fixing the underlying problem, make the
problem worse. For instance, favoring creditors by increasing taxes or reducing
services beyond a point which is acceptable to residents could lead to residents
moving out or the municipality becoming unattractive for others to move into.134
Even if creditors are not interested in a sufficient level of services for residents
“because they are simply people,” they should be interested “because they are
the city’s taxpayers, the ones who can make creditors whole over the long
run.”135
The discussion about residents and the services they expect suggests that it
is important that an understanding of what municipalities should do guides
municipal bankruptcy outcomes. Professor Michelle Wilde Anderson sheds
some light on what municipalities should do.136 She observes that there is broad
agreement that even distressed municipalities should provide “minimum
services ‘consistent with public health and safety.’”137 Then, as part of
understanding how much a municipality can pay its creditors, it is necessary to
understand how much money is required for the municipality to provide
minimum services. Anderson develops a framework centered around a
municipality’s habitability.138 At a high level, “[h]abitability is . . . a
commitment to the safety and comfort of a neighborhood’s residents.”139
Specifically, that comes down to “collective conditions, such as crime rates, fire
risk, emergency response times, access to clean water, access to wastewater
disposal systems, and street lighting.”140 To assess how much money would be
required to maintain a habitable municipality, Anderson suggests extrapolating
from land use laws, building codes, and environmental regulation.141 Further,
she suggests looking to regional indicators for police and fire departments
response times as well as considering the adequacy of the city’s education
system in determining whether the city can provide minimum services.142

133

Id. at 1122–23.
See id. at 1169 (asking whether creditors, among others, would be better off if cities continued owning
public property).
135
Id. at 1123.
136
See id. at 1118.
137
Id. at 1123.
138
Id. at 1197.
139
Id. at 1198.
140
Id. at 1198.
141
Id. at 1197–1202.
142
Id. at 1202–04.
134
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Regardless of the specific metrics used, the point is that when the municipal pie
is being divided up, an adequate share has to be reserved for its residents.
Surveying the policy underlying chapter 9 suggests that bankruptcy should
provide municipal debtors with a fresh start,143 ensure residents have access to
certain minimum services that promote habitability,144 and protect the interests
of creditors as a group.145 One way to promote all these interests is to, at any
given point, stop the situation from getting worse. As a municipality’s fiscal
situation gets worse, it continues to take on more and more expensive, unpayable
debt, making it costlier to get a fresh start.146 The increased debt load puts the
municipality’s creditors in a precarious position.147 At the same time, the
municipality starts raising taxes, selling public property, and cutting services,
making residents worse off.148
D. Criticisms of Municipal Bankruptcies Are Not Well-founded
Most of the literature surrounding chapter 9 discusses its shortcomings.149 In
response, to these shortcomings, Professors McConnell and Picker, and
Professor Gillette suggest that bankruptcy courts should raise taxes and reduce
municipal services.150 Professor Kimhi suggests that chapter 9 should be scaled
back to deal just with the holdout problem, while most municipal debt resolution
should be handled by the state.151
Professors McConnell and Picker suggest that Section 904’s limitations on
bankruptcy judges should be relaxed.152 Specifically, they argue a bankruptcy
143

See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1195–99 (2014).
145
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 100–01 (1984).
146
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456–57 (1993).
147
Id.
148
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1153 (2014).
149
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993) (“Under the present municipal bankruptcy regime,
bankruptcy serves . . . . little function at all.”); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353–54 (2010) (“[B]ankruptcy law . . . is not a sensible solution
for urban economic crises.”).
150
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 288 (2012).
151
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 395 (2010).
152
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
144
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court should be able to order tax increases, reductions in services, pledge
revenue streams to repayment, and sell municipal property.153 While conceding
that these powers would explicitly violate Section 904,154 they argue that a
bankruptcy judge could implicitly exercise these powers by rejecting
restructuring plans that do not include resource adjustments.155 They further
argue that as a result of giving the bankruptcy court resource adjustment powers,
“bankruptcy would displace democratic decisionmaking.”156 But because they
claim that municipal distress is a function of dysfunctional politics, this
displacement may be a benefit.157 Expanded bankruptcy powers would also be
akin to state receivership, which McConnell and Picker view favorably.158 In
effect then, expanded bankruptcy powers could make the bankruptcy court a
type of super-receiver.
There are drawbacks to this approach. One apparent issue is how much of
these resource adjustment powers bankruptcy courts should exercise.
McConnell and Picker suggest that a bankruptcy court not be allowed to sell
“[p]ublic trust” property” which “provide[s] a genuine public good.”159 But they
cite favorably a state receiver who closed libraries to balance a city budget.160 Is
a library not a public good? Perhaps the more substantial drawback is that it is
not clear whether allowing a bankruptcy court to exercise resource allocation
powers is constitutional.161 In response to these constitutional concerns,
McConnell and Picker suggest a solution is to allow states set up their own
municipal bankruptcy systems.162 Separately, allowing the bankruptcy court to

Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993); see 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018).
153
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 475–76 (1993); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 283 (2012). Following Professor
Gillette, I refer to these as “resource adjustments.” Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 283 (2012).
154
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018).
155
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 474 (1993); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 295–96 (2012) (suggesting 11 U.S.C.
§ 904 should be repealed).
156
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993).
157
Id. at 472–73.
158
See id. at 473.
159
Id. at 477.
160
Id. at 473.
161
Id. at 478–79.
162
Id. at 479.
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sell assets while the municipality is distressed could result in lower prices in the
short term and greater costs to replace sold resources in the long term.163
II. ARGUMENT
A. Federal Courts Are the Proper Venue for Municipal Debt Resolution
As Warren notes, bankruptcy courts often consider impacts on noncreditors.164 With respect to municipal bankruptcies, the Code facilitates that
goal by allowing municipalities relative control over their bankruptcy
proceedings.165 Because municipal residents are a special class of impacted noncreditors, a bankruptcy court should be mindful of their interests. A municipality
is in the best position to determine how much money is required to provide
residents with minimum services. Thus, allowing only the municipality to
prepare debt reorganization plans allows the municipality to bake these costs
into the plan before distributing funds to creditors.166 Unlike a state receiver, a
municipality’s elected government is more likely to be attuned and responsive
to the needs of its residents.167 This might be in part because of electoral
demands, and in part because the state is likely to be more concerned with the
cost of borrowing across municipalities.168
Even if bankruptcy should only consider the interests of creditors, quicker
access to the bankruptcy court still makes sense. Unlike private creditors,
municipal creditors do not run to the courthouse at the first sight of municipal
distress because courts cannot provide them much relief.169 Instead, creditors
run to the state legislature.170 State legislatures are more concerned with
borrowing costs across the state than they are with conditions in any particular
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Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1167–68 (2014).
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (1987).
165
11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018).
166
See id. § 941.
167
See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Capital Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204002304576626752997922080 (noting “tensions between city officials
and state lawmakers, who draw much of their power base from the suburbs.”).
168
See id.; Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in
Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 527 (2013); David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from
Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 687 (2015); Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode
Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119038856045
76486610528775994.
169
David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675,
690 (2015).
170
See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486610528775994.
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municipality.171 As a result, creditors with more political power end up better
off than those with less.172 In the Central Falls case, the Rhode Island legislature
thought it was better to protect bondholders who lent to municipalities across the
state than to protect a local pension which lent to only one municipality.173 These
state dictated plans favor one class of creditor over other classes, running counter
to the aims of bankruptcy. Further, as McConnell and Picker note, waiting until
a municipality is insolvent adds to a municipality’s debt load and makes
creditors as a group worse off in the end.174 Crucially, the time between when
municipal distress becomes apparent and when the municipality becomes
insolvent is a window for creditors to lobby state legislators for preferential
treatment.
1. The Federal Government Has Long Been Involved in Municipal Debt
Crises
Federal bankruptcy courts are the proper venue to resolve municipal debt
problems. The federal government has long been involved in municipal debt
markets.175 Its interest in municipal distress is apparent from the creation of
chapter 9 itself. More specifically, “the federal government is aggressively in
favor of state and local debt.”176 In fact, it subsidizes municipal debt by
exempting interest paid on municipal bonds from federal income taxes.177 This
encourages municipalities to take on debt to build infrastructure that the federal

171
See, e.g., Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion
in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 527 (2013); David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons
from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 687 (2015); Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode
Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119038856
04576486610528775994.
172
Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html (noting that
creditors may have been treated equally in bankruptcy if not for statutory preference for bondholders).
173
Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486610528775994 (“State officials and lawmakers
say the law is needed to lure investors to bonds that will be sold by other Rhode Island municipalities.”).
174
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456–57 (1993).
175
David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State and
Local Budget Crises 1 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278.
176
Id. at 12.
177
26 U.S.C. § 103 (2018); David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal
Government During State and Local Budget Crises 12 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278.
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government does not build, or in the case of municipal pensions, to provide
retirement benefits to employees not covered by Social Security.178
While the federal government has consistently encouraged municipalities to
borrow, it has responded to municipal fiscal distress in unpredictable and
inconsistent ways.179 After the Revolutionary War, the federal government
assumed the states’ war debts.180 But in the 1830s and 1840s, the federal
government refused to bailout states that had overextended themselves by
building canals and other infrastructure, causing these states to default on its
bonds.181
In response, many states enacted debt limits and reduced its infrastructure
investments.182 As state governments reduced its borrowing, local governments
began borrowing heavily, often to entice railroads to come to its towns.183
Subsidies to railroads, funded by municipal debt, complemented the federal
policy of having trains run from sea to shining sea.184 When many of these
municipalities faced default, sometimes because of chicanery and sometimes
because of economics, the Supreme Court stepped in to require municipalities
to pay their debts to protect municipal debt markets nationally.185 Sometimes the
Supreme Court overrode a state supreme court’s interpretation of its own
constitution in order to require the municipality to pay.186
Around the same time, and in contrast to its position on municipal railroad
bonds, the Supreme Court often disallowed creditors from collecting debts from
many southern states, sympathizing with “white-dominated ‘Redeemer’
governments,” while “punish[ing] lenders for working with racially-mixed
Reconstruction era governments.”187 Partially as a result, northern, midwestern,
and western cities accessed municipal bond markets to build “[m]any of the
178
David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State and
Local Budget Crises 12–13 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278; Danielle Kurtzleben, Everything you need to know about the Detroit
bankruptcy, VOX (Dec. 15, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/18073574/detroit-bankruptcypensions-municipal (“some of the city’s public-sector retirees aren’t eligible for Social Security benefits”).
179
See David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State
and Local Budget Crises 15 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278.
180
Id. at 15–16.
181
Id. at 16–19.
182
Id. at 19.
183
Id. at 21–22.
184
Id. at 21–22.
185
Id. at 22, 26–31.
186
Id. at 26–27.
187
Id. at 39–40.
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greatest pieces of urban infrastructure,” while southern states were locked out of
the municipal bond market for years.188
During the Depression, around the same time Congress was enacting
municipal bankruptcy legislation, Arkansas was on the brink of default.189 This
time the federal government withheld federal funds to force the state to negotiate
in an “onerous” restructuring with its existing creditors.190 The federal
government later bought new bonds from Arkansas allowing it to pay off the
restructured debt.191
The federal government’s response to New York City’s fiscal crisis is
discussed supra in Part II B, while the government’s responses to fiscal crises in
Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico are outside the scope of this Comment.
The federal government’s long involvement in municipal debt markets,
particularly its history of responding to municipal fiscal crises, makes a
compelling case for municipal distress to be adjudicated in federal bankruptcy
courts. Further, while the federal government’s response has historically been
inconsistent, sometimes preferring creditors and sometimes preferring
municipal debtors, bankruptcy provides a standard framework in which
municipal debt resolution can be resolved in a “uniform” manner.192
2. Federal Courts Are Not Powerless When Adjudicating Municipal
Bankruptcies
A bankruptcy court may not be as powerless as McConnell and Picker
suggest. While the bankruptcy court is statutorily limited in what it can impose
on the municipality without the municipality’s consent, the court still retains
significant persuasive authority and can have a significant impact on the case’s
outcome based on how it manages and structures the case.193 This influence
begins with the appointment of the judge overseeing the case. Unlike in other
bankruptcies, the chief judge of the region’s federal circuit court of appeals
appoints a judge to preside over a municipal bankruptcy.194 This selection can
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Id. at 35–36, 40.
Id. at 41.
190
Id. at 45.
191
Id. at 46.
192
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
193
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
55, 59 (2016).
194
11 U.S.C. § 921 (2018); Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy,
33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59 (2016).
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DAVE_PROOF_5.18.22

2022]

5/18/2022 1:49 PM

RETHINKING ROADBLOCKS

301

shape the outcome of the case. An experienced judge can more easily lead a case
to a thoughtful resolution. As Professor Melissa Jacoby explains, the bankruptcy
court in Detroit’s case played a significant role in the proceeding.195
The court’s involvement began with the appointment of a bankruptcy judge.
The Sixth Circuit’s Chief Judge, Alice Batchelder, herself a former bankruptcy
judge,196 appointed Judge Steven Rhodes to preside over Detroit’s bankruptcy
case, based on his “‘outstanding administrative and case management skills,’”
and his judicial views.197 Judge Rhodes specifically delayed his retirement to
preside over Detroit’s bankruptcy case.198 Contrary to those who believe a
bankruptcy judge has a very limited role in a municipal bankruptcy, Judge
Rhodes “was an active participant, with deep substantive engagement, at the
micro and macro levels.”199 He began by entering an aggressive scheduling order
that went beyond the Code’s requirements.200 Rhodes also effectively used tools
well within the court’s power to prevent Detroit from dragging its feet with
respect to resolution.201 For example, when the city dithered on dealing with tort
claims, Rhodes made it clear that he would lift the automatic stay with respect
to tort claimants if the city did not “make substantial progress on a
comprehensive plan for all tort claimants in thirty-five days.”202 The threat
worked, and the city filed a plan “[a]s if on cue.”203
Rhodes also proposed that the parties use Chief Judge Gerald Rosen of the
Eastern District of Michigan as a mediator in the case.204 The parties understood,
and Rhodes accepted, that he had appointed Rosen to reduce delay, produce a
debt adjustment plan that could be confirmed, and, in general, to “‘crack
heads.’”205 Indeed, Rosen cracked heads by threatening to hold creditors in
contempt, securing funding for Detroit from private foundations, convincing the
state to match the private funding, and leaning on the city manager over a

195
See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE
J. ON REG. 55 (2016).
196
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/batchelder-alice-moore (last visited
Feb. 7, 2022).
197
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55,
73–74 (2016) (italics in original).
198
Id. at 103.
199
Id. at 81.
200
Id. at 75.
201
See id. at 77–78.
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Id. at 77.
203
Id. at 77.
204
Id. at 81.
205
Id. at 87–88 n.233.
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weekend to delay a proposed pension freeze.206 Judge Rosen was also
instrumental in designing the Grand Bargain which formed the “centerpiece” of
Detroit’s debt adjustment plan.207 Having Rosen lead the mediation “put the
federal court in a profoundly powerful position, with continuous opportunities
to shape municipal reform.”208
Judge Rhodes also appointed an expert to testify about whether the proposed
plan was feasible.209 In addition, he appointed a non-testifying consultant to
advise him on the plan’s feasibility.210 Rhodes also allowed members of the
public to speak and ask questions during the bankruptcy proceedings.211 These
interactions provided Rhodes with significant information regarding Detroit’s
condition beyond formal court filings.212 This offered the court “opportunities
to weigh in on local policy and personnel matters.”213 Rhodes used these
opportunities to examine the city’s water delivery and advocate for the city to
continue to retain its emergency manger.214
Many of the bankruptcy court’s proposed actions require consent from the
municipal debtor.215 While securing the required consent seems like a high bar
to clear, the Detroit court did not have much difficulty with this requirement.216
As Jacoby notes, while nearly every issue at stake in the bankruptcy proceeding
went to mediation, “there is no sign that consent was specifically elicited for
each matter.”217 Further, Rhodes needed Detroit’s consent to install an examiner
to review the fees professionals were charging Detroit.218 In part, he received
this consent by “express[ing] hope that the city would not object,” in open
court.219 Thus, Jacoby suggests that while the court might often need a
municipality’s consent, the municipality might find it difficult to object.220
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While it is debatable whether, in some instances, Judge Rhodes coerced
Detroit into accepting certain provisions, the bankruptcy court also served as a
check on creditors. Judge Rosen, the mediator, at one point threatened to hold a
creditor in contempt if it did not accept an offer.221 Fear of angering the mediator
led creditors back to the negotiating table.222 Bankruptcy courts have a larger
arsenal of tools than states or other entities when dealing with municipal
creditors. Only bankruptcy provides the automatic stay preventing creditors
from collecting from the debtor.223 Only the bankruptcy court can order debt to
be discharged or otherwise impair contracts underlying the debt.224 And only the
bankruptcy court can bind holdout creditors to a debt adjustment plan and
prevent dissenting creditors from hobbling a resolution plan.225 Finally, a
bankruptcy court is not constrained by what the effects of a discharge for one
municipality would mean for another. In these ways, the bankruptcy court is
much more powerful than states when it comes to municipal debt resolution.
Detroit’s example suggests that a bankruptcy court, contrary to conventional
wisdom, can exercise significant discretion in a municipal bankruptcy case. The
appointment of the presiding judge, the presiding judge’s “suggestion” of
another judge as a mediator, and ultimately, a plan in part designed by the
mediator, all suggest some level of judicial stage-managing of the Detroit
bankruptcy.226 The Detroit experience negates the McConnell-Picker argument
that federal bankruptcy courts do not have enough power to make municipal
bankruptcies effective.227
3. The Bankruptcy Code’s Restrictions on Bankruptcy Courts Result in
Creative Solutions
Detroit’s example also shows that the Code’s consent requirements can be
used to design more thoughtful outcomes. For example, Detroit’s creditors
(including pensioners) wanted the city to sell art owned by the city and held by
the DIA.228 Instead, the mediator was able to negotiate a deal in which private
221

Id. at 84.
Id. at 87.
223
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).
224
Id. § 944(b).
225
Id. § 944(a)(3).
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See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
55, 103 (2016).
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See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993).
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Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings? The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand
Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015).
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donors, foundations, and the state would contribute money to pay pensioners,
transfer the museum to a trust, and prevent it from having to sell of its art
collection.229
In Detroit’s case, the state attorney general issued an opinion stating none of
the art could be sold to pay the city’s debt.230 The Emergency Manager, Kevyn
Orr, thought only some of the art could be sold, and creditors thought all the art
could be sold.231 The valuation for the art Orr thought could be sold ranged from
$454 to $867 million.232 The valuation of the entire collection ranged from $1.1
billion to over $8 billion.233 In a routine bankruptcy case, the art would have
entered the bankruptcy estate and the whole collection could have been sold to
pay off creditors.234 Here, it was clear that the emergency manager (and,
accordingly, the city) would not consent to the entire collection being sold, and
the state may well have restricted the city manager from allowing any of the art
to be sold.235 Additionally, given the public impact of a municipal bankruptcy
case, the court may have been constrained by public opinion more than it would
have been in a non-municipal bankruptcy.
The “Grand Bargain” emerged against this background.236 Judge Rhodes
seemed mindful of the public benefit provided by the art and wary of the idea
that selling the art would help the city.237 Judge Rosen, the mediator, then
gathered philanthropic leaders and “asked [them] to donate hundreds of millions
of dollars to alleviate the municipal deficit faced by the City’s pension funds.”238
229
Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings? The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand
Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015).
230
Id. at 16–17.
231
Id. at 16–17. Although, it is questionable if the city manager, appointed by the state, could agree to
selling the art in violation of the state attorney general’s opinion.
232
Id. at 17.
233
Id. at 18.
234
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018). Section 541 governs the content of a bankruptcy estate – all of a debtor’s
legal and/or equitable property interests, which include proceeds, products, rent, and property interests of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018). Section 363(b) allows debtor organizations to sell substantially all of their assets
to qualified purchasers outside the scope of ordinary business, thereby allowing debtor organizations to pay off
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018).
235
See Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings? The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand
Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2015).
236
Id. at 23.
237
See Randy Kennedy, Fate of Detroit’s Art Hangs in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/us/fate-of-detroits-art-hangs-in-the-balance.html (speculating how Judge
Rhodes likely felt that selling the art “would not have helped Detroit to avoid bankruptcy.”); see also Melissa B.
Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 80 (2015) (discussing
Judge Rhodes’ consideration of the museum’s value to the community based on witness testimony when
evaluating the merits of the plan).
238
Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings? The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand
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Rosen was able to secure over $300 million in pledges from the foundations,
DIA raised $100 million, and the state-approved $200 million in funding.239
These funds were then used to pay pensioners.240 The resulting deal left
pensioners in a better position than originally expected without auctioning off
the DIA’s collection.241
The Grand Bargain represents an innovative and creative solution that
materialized partly because of the restrictions placed on municipal bankruptcies.
Giving courts too much resource adjustment power may well have led to a
thoughtless liquidation of an invaluable art collection for the benefit of
municipal creditors.
B. Congress Should Remove Roadblocks to Municipal Bankruptcy
Removing barriers to bankruptcy courts provides a municipality with a better
chance at a fresh start. Further, because a municipality is best suited to
understand the needs of its residents, allowing it to remain in charge of its
bankruptcy proceeding would lead to better outcomes for its residents. Finally,
removing roadblocks to municipal bankruptcy would leave creditors, as a group,
in a better position than they otherwise would be.
With respect to a fresh start, removing barriers to bankruptcy would allow
debts to be discharged earlier rather than later. This would save considerable
resources between the time a municipality becomes distressed and when it is
insolvent. At the outset, this allows the municipality into the bankruptcy process
in a better position than it otherwise would be. Starting from this relatively
stronger position, the municipality has a better chance of emerging from
bankruptcy in a better position than when it entered it.
1. Barriers to Municipal Bankruptcies Allow the State and Federal
Government to Exercise Excessive Control Over Municipalities
Often, municipalities are not trying to extract bailouts from states, but states
want to impose bailouts because they give states greater leverage; states can use
their authority to prevent bankruptcy petitions or exploit the twilight zone
between when a municipality is in “dire financial straits,” but not yet insolvent,
Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015).
239
See id. at 23–25.
240
See id. at 26.
241
See id. at 26 (“The effect of the Grand Bargain on those receiving city pensions was a positive one
under the circumstances. As a result of the Grand Bargain, ‘pension reductions for retirees . . . are now
significantly less than the City has originally concluded would be necessary.’”).
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to exert control over municipalities.242 In fact, states are able to exert more
control over a municipality outside of bankruptcy than they are in the bankruptcy
process.243
Through debt resolution processes, such as appointing emergency managers
and implementing receiverships, states often take control of their
municipalities.244 For example, in Pennsylvania, once a court confirms a
receiver’s municipal debt resolution plan, the municipality’s elected and
appointed officials’ authority is suspended “to the extent that the power would
interfere with the powers granted to the receiver or the goals of the recovery
plan.”245 Further, a receiver may order a municipality’s officials to take, or
refrain from taking, actions to implement the receiver’s debt modification
plan.246 If the officials refuse, the receiver can obtain a writ of mandamus from
a court.247 Similarly, Rhode Island allows receivers to exercise powers of a
municipality’s elected officials, and specifically provides “that the powers of the
receiver shall be superior to and supersede the powers of the elected officials of
the city.”248
In Pennsylvania, Harrisburg’s city council voted to reject a state bailout
when faced with financial distress.249 Part of the disagreement between the city
and the state was over how to raise revenue to pay off debt – the city council
wanted to pass a commuter tax, while the state wanted the city to sell and lease
assets.250 After its bankruptcy petition was dismissed, Harrisburg was placed
into state receivership and its situation was resolved in line with the state’s
plan.251 Along the way, the receiver obtained a writ of mandamus to require
242
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
243
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a
Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 638 (1995) (explaining that the state
board’s actions to raise taxes after the Bridgeport municipality filed for bankruptcy had no effect on the
municipality because of the automatic stay).
244
See M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 846 (2014).
245
53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.704(a)(2) (West 2020).
246
Id. § 11701.708(a).
247
Id. § 11701.709.
248
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(c) (2020).
249
Michael Corkery, Capital Files for Bankruptcy: In Fight With State, Harrisburg, Pa., Rejects
Governor-Backed Plan to Sell Assets, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52970204002304576626752997922080.
250
Id.
251
See Kris Maher, Harrisburg Will Exit State Receivership: Judge Determines Capital City’s Fiscal
Emergency Is Over, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2014, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
4709904579407431943602344; see also Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Set to Exit Pennsylvania’s First City
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Harrisburg to increase its income tax over the city council’s opposition.252 Had
Harrisburg’s bankruptcy proceeding continued, the city would have had a much
greater say in its debt resolution;253 only Harrisburg would have been allowed to
submit plans on how it wanted to resolve its debts.254 Further, a bankruptcy court
could not have imposed an income tax increase or sold Harrisburg’s property
without the city’s consent, since that would have violated Section 904’s
prohibition on interfering with a municipality’s political powers and
properties.255
States may also be trying to circumvent the Code’s automatic stay provisions
by preventing municipalities from declaring bankruptcy. The automatic stay
prevents entities from commencing or continuing “a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor.”256 Among other things, it
prevents “all entities” from engaging in “any act to create, perfect, or enforce
any lien against property of the estate.”257
In 2011, Rhode Island was concerned with the contagion associated with
Central Falls’ declaration of bankruptcy.258 The town was already in
receivership, and the state-appointed receiver had the power to file for

Receivership, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0115/harrisburg-set-to-exit-pennsylvania-s-first-city-receivership.
252
See Walker v. City of Harrisburg, 2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 260, at *7 (Commw. Ct. Aug. 27, 2012);
see also
Nick Malawskey, Judge Approves Harrisburg Earned Income Tax Increase; Rules Against City’s Need for a
Spokesman, PENNLIVE (Aug. 27, 2012, 9:28 PM), https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2012/08/judge_harrisburg_
earned_income.html (stating that the receiver was able to force an income tax rate increase from 1% to 2%).
253
Cf. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 356–57 (2010) (explaining how the bankruptcy court has relatively little power over debtor
municipalities once a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 9 is approved).
254
See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2018).
255
See id. § 904; cf. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 357 (2010) (“The court may not instruct local officials to take any action (such as a tax
increase or an expenditures cut) . . . .”); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 474 (1993) (“To be sure, the court
may not order reductions in expenditure, sale of property, renegotiation of contracts, or increase in taxes.”).
256
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2018).
257
Id. § 362(a)(4).
258
See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in
Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 527 (2013); David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from
Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 687 (2015); see also Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in
Rhode Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885
604576486610528775994 (Rhode Island Revenue Director, Rosemary Booth stated, “[w]e didn’t want
bondholders to think this state was not a good place to put their money,” when discussing the rationale behind
the law’s enactment).
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bankruptcy.259 He did so on August 1, 2011.260 Just a few weeks earlier, Rhode
Island enacted a statute providing general obligation bondholders a statutory lien
on a city’s tax and general fund revenues.261 Prior to the enactment of this statute,
Central Falls’ bondholders and pensioners were unsecured creditors and would
have been dealt with equally in bankruptcy.262 Instead, Rhode Island secured the
bondholders’ debts, ensuring they would be paid in full, even before the
pensioners had been paid at all.263 Had Central Falls declared bankruptcy before
the lien was enacted, the automatic stay would have prevented Rhode Island
from creating the lien.264
In the 1970s, New York City requested federal assistance to avoid
bankruptcy.265 The federal government provided loans to New York City, which
were secured by liens on the city’s income.266 Further, the loans came with
conditions specifying when the city had to try to again sell bonds on the
market.267 Outside bankruptcy, the federal government was able to impose these
terms on New York; however, if New York had access to present-day chapter 9,
a bankruptcy court could not have imposed these terms since they interfered with
New York’s enjoyment of its income and with its political and governmental
powers.268
By being able to control if and when a municipality can file for bankruptcy,
and aided by the high bar of showing insolvency, states are able to exert
significant control over their municipality’s debt resolution planning.
259

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(b)(3) (2020).
See Martha Kessler, City of Central Falls, R.I., Files Chapter 9 Petition; Governor Calls Situation
‘Dire’, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 3, 2011, 3:23 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/city-ofcentral-falls-ri-files-chapter-9-petition-governor-calls-situation-dire.
261
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(b)(3) (2020); see Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119038856045764866105287
75994.
262
Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html.
263
See David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
675, 687 (2015).
264
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2018) (preventing “any act to create . . . any lien against property of the
estate”).
265
See Jeff Nussbaum, The Night New York Saved Itself from Bankruptcy, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2015,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-night-new-york-saved-itself-from-bankruptcy (as of 1974,
“New York’s leaders continued to petition for federal help.”).
266
See Martin Tolchin, 8% Interest Rate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/
27/archives/8-interest-rate.html.
267
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 3276, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the
Finances, Fiscal Year 1978 (1979) at 37.
268
See 11 U.S.C. § 904(1) (2018) (restricting the court from interfering with “any of the political or
governmental powers of the debtor”).
260
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2. The Salience of Moral Hazard Is Overstated
Proponents of current roadblocks to municipal bankruptcy argue that the
statutory requirements prevent moral hazard.269 Moral hazard can be defined as
“the lack of incentive to avoid risk where there is protection against its
consequences.”270 In the context of a municipality, this could mean filing for
bankruptcy instead of taking politically inconvenient steps such as increasing
taxes or reducing services.271 Indeed, Bridgeport filed for bankruptcy to avoid a
tax increase.272 Similarly, Harrisburg tried to avoid increasing taxes on its
residents and selling its property.273 Proponents of the insolvency requirement
believe it “reduces the moral hazard of easy debt relief” by making it difficult to
enter the bankruptcy process and obtain a debt discharge.274 Specifically, a
municipality should be more careful about getting into debt if it knows it will
have to pay it back.275
Professor Kevin Kordana rebuts the McConnell-Picker resource adjustment
proposal by arguing persuasively against the salience of a moral hazard in
municipal bankruptcy.276 He suggests state level caps on the maximum interest
rate at which municipalities can issue bonds limits moral hazard as these caps
could shut out especially risky municipalities from bond markets.277 Kordana
continues by analogizing municipal debt to sovereign debt, and analyzing game
theoretical models and empirical results around sovereign debt defaults.278 The
analogy between municipal and sovereign debt makes sense because creditors
to both municipalities and countries have limited recourse if their borrowers

269
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
270
Moral Hazard, OED ONLINE, https://www.oed.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/view/Entry/122086?
redirectedFrom=moral+hazard& (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
271
See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 283 (2012); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1035, 1068 (1997).
272
See Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case
Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 626 (1995).
273
Michael Corkery, Capital Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970204002304576626752997922080.
274
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
275
See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1068 n.162
(1997).
276
See generally id. at 1070–89.
277
Id. at 1070–71; see CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 53531 (West 2020) (current statute capping interest rates).
278
See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1070–71
(1997).
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default.279 The upshot of the theoretical analysis is that for a variety of reasons
including reputation, desire to keep low interest rates, and inability to credibly
threaten default, countries have reasons to keep paying their debts even if moral
hazard concerns would suggest otherwise.280 The empirical results, in line with
the theoretical results, do not find evidence that moral hazard is a salient
concern.281 While Professor Kordana uses the critique of moral hazard to counter
arguments that bankruptcy courts should be allowed to raise taxes, the same
concern underlies strict filing requirements and other roadblocks to municipal
bankruptcy.282 This evidence suggests that concern is “misplaced.”283 Further,
the fact that federal government policy towards municipal debt encourages
“even small local governments to issue substantial amounts of debt”284
undercuts the argument that the insolvency requirement is a federal statutory
limitation on moral hazard.
Even taking concerns about moral hazard at face value, statutory roadblocks
provide opportunities to bailout and control municipal distress. It is possible that
these bailouts raise their own, slightly different, moral hazard concerns.
Municipal lenders often believe that state and federal governments are implicitly
backing their loans to municipalities.285 By bailing out municipalities, state and
federal governments may be strengthening the implicit guarantee and making it
into a de facto guarantee. State and federal governments that have previously
bailed out one municipality may lack the credibility to suggest they would not
bail out another.286 Thus, the statutory roadblocks may not be mitigating the
municipality’s moral hazard but instead creating moral hazard for
bondholders.287

279

See id. at 1072.
See generally id. at 1071–85.
281
See id. at 1085–89.
282
See id. at 1038–39; Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
283
Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1997).
284
David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government During State and
Local Budget Crises 4 (July 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278.
285
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 460 (1993); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political
Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 286–87 (2012).
286
See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1083 (1997).
287
Bondholders also have insurance on their municipal bonds, which may further increase their moral
hazard problem. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion
in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 536 (2013).
280
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Rhode Island’s creation of a statutory lien for general obligation bondholders
did just that.288 Even as Central Falls was placed into receivership and moving
towards bankruptcy, the statutory lien made Central Falls attractive to
bondholders.289
3. Gatekeeping Lengthens the Time to and Cost of Resolution
Gatekeeping lengthens the time from distress to resolution.290 Municipal
distress is apparent before a municipality is insolvent. Therefore, the Code’s
insolvency requirement “postpones the day of reckoning, while the city
continues to pile on new debt at ever-increasing interest rates, further burdening
the municipal budget and guaranteeing that each creditor will receive less value
in bankruptcy.”291 At the same time, delaying what may be inevitable necessarily
means reducing services offered to residents and laying off municipal
employees.292 In addition, the political conflict created by misaligned incentives
between the municipality, the state, and the federal government can also
lengthen the resolution process while adding to the ultimate cost. As Professor
Dorothy Brown points out, the cost of borrowing increased for both Bridgeport
and Connecticut while the city and state argued over the best course to resolve
the city’s financial distress.293
4. Congress Should Remove the Insolvency Requirement
Congress should remove chapter 9’s insolvency requirement. The
requirement rests on shaky theoretical grounds and is difficult to administer. The
difficulty in administering the insolvency tests wastes time as the municipality’s
situation deteriorates.
Non-municipal debtors do not have to be insolvent to file for bankruptcy.294
Of course, the Code treats municipalities differently in the amount of control it
allows them to exercise over their bankruptcy proceedings.295 Those differences
are explained by constitutional concerns over how much power the federal
288
Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486610528775994.
289
Id.
290
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
291
Id. at 456–57.
292
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1153 (2014).
293
Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study
in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 640 (1995).
294
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018), with 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2018).
295
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018), with 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2018).
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government can exert over municipalities.296 But those concerns do not explain
the insolvency requirement. Instead, the literature suggests that the insolvency
requirement is needed to prevent moral hazard.297 But as this Comment
discussed earlier, moral hazard concerns are overstated.298 Just as a proper
understanding of risk of moral hazard reduces the need for resource
adjustments,299 so too does it reduce the need for the insolvency requirement.
In addition to being built on a shaky theoretical foundation, the insolvency
requirement is also difficult to administer. The code provides that a municipality
is insolvent if it is “not paying its debts as they become due” or is “unable to pay
its debts as they become due.”300 The first element would be met if “the bills
arrive and cannot be paid.”301 The second element would be met if the
municipality would not be able to pay bills that have yet to come due.302 Chapter
9 does not specify the time horizon in which the municipality would have to be
unable to pay its debts,303 but at least one court has suggested it must be either
in the current or next fiscal year.304
Despite Bridgeport being in “dire financial straits,”305 the court found it was
not insolvent, because it had access to a bond fund to pay its upcoming debts,
even though using those funds would require the city to repay them.306 Professor
Gillette argues that having observed that the funds that could be used to plug the
current deficit would have to be repaid in the next two fiscal years, “[t]he court
. . . could have concluded that the prospective test was satisfied.”307 He goes on
296
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 356–57 (2010).
297
See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
298
See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1070 (1997).
299
See id. at 1038–39.
300
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(c) (2018).
301
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
302
Id. at 456; see In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
303
In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (“Although the beginning point of the
analysis is the date the petition was filed, neither § 101(32)(C)(ii) nor its legislative history provide guidance on
how far into the future it should go.”).
304
Id. at 338; Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 817, 864 (2019).
305
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456 (1993).
306
In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C.
Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425,
456 (1993); Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case
Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 625, 638–39 (1995).
307
Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79
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to suggest that the state’s opposition to Bridgeport’s bankruptcy filing “may
have been influential” in finding Bridgeport was not insolvent.308 Thus the
insolvency test forces municipalities and courts to show just how bad their bad
fiscal situation is. As a result, the insolvency requirement becomes the “principal
obstacle to earlier municipal debt relief,”309 and the test’s ambiguity allows for
extraneous concerns to drive the final analysis.310
The service delivery insolvency test does not resolve the test’s overall
ambiguity; instead, it leaves open the question of what baseline level the current
level of service is to be compared to.311 While judges applying the cash-flow test
may have to compare competing financial projections, judges applying the
service delivery insolvency test would have to decide whether a municipality’s
lack of services is lacking enough to warrant a finding of insolvency. This again
leaves open the possibility of allowing extraneous considerations to enter the
analysis.
Further, the insolvency requirement creates bad incentives for creditors. As
the Bridgeport example suggests, a creditor could offer a municipality a loan
with stringent terms and thus prevent it from accessing bankruptcy relief.312 In
Bridgeport, the available funds came from a municipal bond fund which would
have had to be replenished.313 It would not be a stretch for a court to conclude
then that a city must exhaust all available lines of credit to meet current debt
payments. A creditor may find it preferable to offer more credit to a city
struggling to meet its obligations than let the city file for bankruptcy and
potentially discharge its debt. On the other hand, a preferred creditor, such as a
bondholder in Rhode Island,314 could withhold new loans, potentially forcing a
municipality to seek discharge of non-preferred loans, before lending it more
money.

U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 293 (2012).
308
Id. at 326.
309
Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 864
(2019).
310
See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 328 (2012).
311
See Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy, 2019
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1214, 1220 (2019).
312
See In re Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
313
Id.; see Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism,
Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 293 (2012).
314
See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html.
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Only municipalities must be insolvent to file for bankruptcy.315 The
assumptions underlying this unique requirement are misstated. Further, the
requirement’s tests are difficult and time-consuming to carry out and may
provide cover for decisions based on extraneous reasons. Finally, the insolvency
requirement provides improper incentives to municipal creditors. Removing the
insolvency requirement would allow a municipality to begin adjusting its debts
earlier rather than later. Moreover, it would allow a bankruptcy court to assist in
this process, instead of trying to draw a distinction between whether a
municipality’s condition is bad, or really bad. Reducing the time between the
onset of a fiscal crisis and resolution will probably leave the municipality and
its creditors in a better position. The municipality is likely to have more space
to negotiate with creditors even shortly before it becomes insolvent. Even those
who support the insolvency requirement based on the moral hazard argument
agree that it ends up making debtors and creditors worse off.316 Allowing a
municipality access to the bankruptcy court also reduces the time during which
a state can take over or impose a stringent bailout on a municipality. For these
reasons, Congress should remove the insolvency requirement from chapter 9.317
5. The Federal Government Should Induce States Into Allowing Their
Municipalities Easier Access to Bankruptcy Proceedings
The federal government should induce states into allowing their
municipalities easier access to bankruptcy courts. Eric Lam’s suggestion along
these lines is to relax the state authorization requirement in Section 109(c)(2).318
Specifically, starting from an older version of the statute, which required
general, as opposed to specific, authorization, Lam suggests allowing
municipalities to file for bankruptcy as long as they are “‘not prohibited’” by
state law.319 Instead, Congress went in the opposite direction, leaving us the
“specifically authorized” language we have today.320 Lam’s suggestion could

315
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 455–56 (1993).
316
Id. at 456. Incidentally, McConnell and Picker suggest removing the insolvency requirement if
bankruptcy courts could engage in resource adjustment. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When
Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 477 (1993).
317
See also Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
817, 864–65 (2019) (arguing that “[t]he insolvency requirement must be relaxed if Chapter 9 is to become a
serious tool for addressing municipal financial distress.”).
318
Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9 Eligibility – A Proposal to Amend
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 637 (1990); 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
319
Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9 Eligibility – A Proposal to Amend
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 637 (1990); 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988).
320
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
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possibly alleviate some of the gatekeeping the state authorization requirements
impose. This might allow municipalities in states without authorizing statutes to
access the bankruptcy court.321 But because so many states have created
processes that precede bankruptcy filings, it is unlikely that this suggestion
would end up having a material effect on access to the bankruptcy court.322
While changing the state authorization requirement to allow municipalities
to file in the absence of a state prohibition323 may be a step in the right direction,
it alone will not bring about much change. Instead, the federal government needs
to implement a framework that would alleviate states’ costs associated with
municipal distress.
CONCLUSION
It is uniquely difficult for municipalities to file for bankruptcy. These
difficulties allow state and the federal government to act as gatekeepers and
prevent municipalities from accessing bankruptcy protection and securing a
fresh start. The literature is concerned with maintaining barriers that supposedly
mitigate moral hazard and the bankruptcy courts’ supposed lack of power to
ensure proper debt resolutions. This Comment shows that federal and state
governments use gatekeeping methods to exert control over a municipality. In
addition, the assertion that federal bankruptcy courts are too weak to properly
carry out municipal bankruptcies is incorrect. In fact, bankruptcy courts are
uniquely positioned to guide municipalities in reforming their finances and grant
them a fresh start. These observations suggest that municipalities should have
easier access to the bankruptcy court. Increased access to the bankruptcy court
would comport with federal policy underlying municipal finances and policy
goals underlying the Code. It would also result in more efficient municipal debt
resolutions. Greater access to the bankruptcy court can be achieved by removing
statutory roadblocks, specifically the requirement that municipalities be
insolvent before filing for bankruptcy, as that requirement is difficult to
administer and rests on a shaky theoretical foundation. Finally, because
municipal access to bankruptcy courts requires state approval, the federal

321
See M. Heith Frost, Comment, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific
Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 849–52 (2015).
322
See id. at 838–48 (discussing prerequisites to filing for municipal bankruptcy in many states).
323
Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9 Eligibility – A Proposal to Amend
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 637 (1990).
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government should develop incentives to induce states to allow their
municipalities easier access to bankruptcy courts.
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